Examination of aircraft engine histories provided by
Introduction s
A major focus of popular media attention to the airline deregulation] issue has been on the question of aircraft safety. While economists have devoted journal space to other aspects of deregulation, safety has been a major concern in academic circles as well.
Economists agreed that deregulation would bring down the average price of airline travel, but there was less certainty surrounding the effect on quality of service, Theorists posited that during the regulated era, airlines competed in quality-since price competition was not available to them (see Douglas and Miller ( 1974 ) )-and there has been theoretical treatment of the notion that deregulation would bring a reduction in quality (Moses and * U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Kamien and Vincent, 1990; Panzar and Savage, 1987; Stiglitz and Arnott, 1987; and Braeutigam, 1987) as well as empirical treatment of the notion that airlines have moved sharply to control costs (for example, Card ( 1986 (for example, Card ( , 1989 on the decline of wages paid airline employees since deregulation ). A key component of quality of service is aircraft safety.
There is direct evidence that aggregate safety has not declined since deregulation (see Rose ( 1992) and Morrison and Winston ( 1988 ) ), and that airlines' safety records were not affected by profitability either before (see Golbe ( 1986) ) or after (see Rose ( 1990) ) deregulation. Borenstein and Zimmerman ( 1988) provide evidence that the reverse does not hold: airlines experiencing accidents do suffer financial losses, although not nearly at the level of the social costs.
These empirical studies share one important feature: The number of observations in which an accident is present is quite small. Statistical analysis of rare events is problematic, and it is not inconceivable that results could be driven by airlines' "lucky" or "unlucky" draws. One way of getting around this difficulty is to analyze the actions taken by airlines to enhance safety, and one such action is aircraft engine maintenance.
This article looks at two questions: Did deregulation lead airlines to reduce engine maintenance effort? And if there was a reduction in effort, has it led to deterioration in engine performance?
This study differs from previous ones in two important ways. First, this article is largely an analysis of "effort" as opposed to "performance."
I measure effort by the preventive maintenance performed on aircraft engines. Engine maintenance occurs quite frequently, and because its purpose is to prevent engine failures and, hence, accidents, analysis of maintenance effort is a valid approach to the study of safety.
Second, this study employs a unique and rich dataset not previously available to researchers. Data were collected at the level of an individual aircraft engine, enabling an examination of micro-level decision making in the maintenance process. The data take the form of 42 complete engine histories covering the years 1964 to 1988 provided by Pratt & Whitney, Inc.2 A major advantage of this dataset is the relatively large number of events to be analyzed (engine shutdowns and shop visits) compared to the infrequent occurrence of accidents and what the National Transportation Safety Board terms "incidents" analyzed in the other studies.
Background s
Before describing the data, methodology, and results, it is worthwhile to discuss aircraft engines, maintenance, and regulations briefly. A mechanic described the operation of a jet engine succinctly as "suck, squeeze, bang, and blow." 3 This expression offers a fair representation of major engine processes: Air is pulled into the engine, compressed, and mixed with fuel, The explosion of this mixture and its exhaust propels the plane forward. The high temperatures and intense pressures take a heavy toll on the engine's components, and maintenance and repair can be costly (Table 1) . Much of the cost is labor.
The decision to remove and overhaul an engine depends heavily on information gathered by both the pilot and the ground crew during service checks. Some critical measures, like oil pressure, are readily observable from the cockpit. The ground crew collects other data, 2 Because I wished to address the question of how deregulation affected the treatment of individual engines, the sample was drawn from engines whose service lives covered a substantial period both before and stir deregulation. 1 argue below that the fact that the engines are overhauled means that they are "renewed" at each shop visit and may therefore be considered new enginey this renewal puts the engines on an approximate y equal footing with other renewed engines, 3 Personal interview with Charlie Walters and Roy Fife, aircrafi mechanics with Federal Express, Inc., Madkon, APril 9, 1988. such as horoscope readings. In addition, the engine may encounter foreign object damage (FOD ), particularly from birds or large hailstones, which may necessitate an engine removal. Finally, an engine may be removed as part of a progressive maintenance program or for engine rotation.4 Federal regulations govern all aircraft engine-related matters.5 An air earner wishing to perform service on its own aircraft must meet essentially three sets of standards. First, it must meet the standards set forth in the manufacturer's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA )-approved maintenance manuals. Second, it must meet the standards of its own FAA-approved progressive inspection and maintenance program. Finally, it must meet the additional airworthiness standards set forth in the CFR (Code of Federal Regulations), as well as the regulations concerning records, personnel, and working conditions. The air carrier has some latitude in determining its inspection and maintenance program, although once the airline has committed itself to a specific program it cannot deviate from it. Thus, if the maintenance regulations were binding before deregulation, deregulation should not have affected the airlines' standards.
Many union officials and airline employees insist that the story is more complicated, however. They allege that since the advent of deregulation the incentives to cut costs have driven airlines to hire less-qualified applicants for critical positions, including pilots and line mechanics.6 It should be noted that these personnel must still meet the criteria set forth in the CFR; but primary sources argue that formerly there had been a great deal of slack in the constraints, whereas now there is very little margin between applicant qualifications and the minimums specified in the CFR.
When an engine fails, the consequences are unlikely to be serious, because the aircraft has at least one other engine and can readily perform an emergency landing with the remaining engine (s). Typically, a pilot experiencing an in-flight shutdown will continue to the scheduled destination, unless the shutdown occurred during or shortly after takeoff or there are no qualified mechanics at the destination. Of course, the cost of more than one engine failing on a given aircraft is self-evident and has been quantified (at least indirectly) by Borenstein and Zimmerman ( 1988) .
Obviously, a major objective of airline engine maintenance is to minimize the chance of engine failure. To some extent, the probability of failure is outside the airline's control; a typical exogenous problem is that of FOD. However, engine shutdowns also may result from faulty maintenance or from a pilot's decision based on instrument readings in the cockpit (which sometimes turn out to be false, explaining how an engine may have more than one shutdown during one shop visit cycle ). The engine work in this dataset also reflects the installation of upgrade kits, designed to improve an engine's performance.
Preliminary analysis s
Survival plots (see Kalbfleisch and Prentice ( 1980) ) in Figure 1 suggest that aircraft engines on average are allowed to remain in operation for more engine hours before being overhauled since deregulation than before.
All things equal, we might expect an airline that overhauls engines more frequently to have a better safety record than its rivals. Thus, Figure 1 might initially excite an observer's concern. Indeed, the data for both JT8D and JT9D 7 engines fail the log-rank and generalized Wilcoxon tests for homogeneity of prederegulation and postderegulation data.
We can also observe the distinction between regulated-era and deregulated-era data in the distributions of operating hours, or "hard time," between shop visits, shown in Fig .025 01234567 891O Thousands of hours in the deregulated era. A X2test on the frequencies for each jet type rejects the null hypothesis that the regulated and deregulated samples are drawn from the same distribution.8 Table 2 shows that the average number of operating hours between overhauls roughly doubled (from over 2,100 prederegulation to about 4,400 postderegulation ) for JT8D engines and more than doubled (from about 1,300 prederegulation to about 3,500 postderegulation ) 
4.
Parametric analysis of shop visit cycles and shutdowns s Model specification. In this parametric analysis, I start by assuming that operating hours (t) between shop visits are distributed as two-parameter Weibull (~i, a), where M and a * For JT8D and JT9D engines the values of the test statistic are 228.7009 and 142.383, respectively, with associated degrees of freedom I 1 and 8 and tail probabilities 1.545 x 10'9 and 7.577 X 10-27. The formula for the test statistic is given in the Appendix.
9 The t-statistics are 6.3789 and 10.7594 for the JT8D and JT9D engines respectively, where the alternative hypothesis is that the deregulated means are greater than the regulated (tail probabilities for both statistics are computed to be less than 10-4).
/ THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS are, respectively, the location and scale parameters. Subscript i indexes a "renewal'' -that is, a shop visit cycle. This particular parametrization of the Weibull maximum likelihood estimator is due to Lancaster ( 1979) .
Letting t[ denote the ( hard) time between shop visits i -1 and i, the Weibull probability density function is given by'0~( t,) = IZ, OZ;-l exp (-p, t;) (1)
where xi denotes the vector of covariates and~denotes the ( unknown ) vector of parameters. 11
The data xi contain information on prior shutdowns, prior shop visit rates, engine upgrading, "intensity" of operation, and airline operator. Based on the dates of events, shop visit cycles are classified as occurring during the regulated era or the deregulated era ( post-1978), which 12 Table 3 gives thedefinitions, means> enables another dummy covariate for deregulation. and standard deviations for continuous variables. The sample log-likelihood is obtained by
Thousand engine hours since last shop visit; also referred to as "hard time." Mean = (3.05, 2. 18); Standard Deviation = (2.87, 2. 14). Model number dummies representing upgrades in JT9D engines.
Note: Means and standard deviations are given in the order (JT8D engines, JT9D engines).
'0 This model is popular in unemployment duration studies; see also Heckman and Borjas ( 1980) , Heckman and Singer ( 1985) , and Flinn and Heckman ( 1982) , II Anv function of pmameter~and data that guarantees a positive location parameter willWork. Theexponential form given 'in equation (2) is the function of choice for most empirical work.
12,+n alternative approach is to separate the sample into regulated years and um'ewlatedwan and anahze the differential effect of covariates on the hazards for the two periods. Results from this approach are qualitatively similar but for brevity are not reported here (they are available from the author), taking the natural logarithm of equation ( 1) and summing over i for each engine; a is restricted to a >0 by estimating in (a).
My priors on the coefficients were as follows. If we are to believe the story of, say, Kamien and Vincent ( 1990) that airlines overprovided quality before deregulation, the deregulation dummy (DEREG ) should negatively influence the hazard, since firms would have scaled back their maintenance effort in the face of fierce rivalry.
Prior shop visit rate (NZRT), which indicates the number of times the engine visited the shop per thousand hours of hard time prior to the current shop visit cycle, can play two roles. First, it may signal the seriousness of the airline's maintenance program: a higher shop visit rate is equivalent to more maintenance and thus will lead to a lower hazard rate. Alternatively, the shop visit rate may indicate engines with more problems requiring shop attention, in which case the effect on the hazard rate will be positive. Thus, I will not specify a prior on shop visit rate; the data are permitted to choose which of the two hypotheses applies. i3
The shutdown dummy ( SDDUM) should have a negative effect on the hazard rate, because this indicator conveys the information that an engine has experienced trouble of some sort during its current cycle.
Intensity of use ( INTENS) should have a positive effect on the hazard rate, assuming that it is accurately measured, because a more intensely used engine can be expected to wear out (and therefore require shop attention ) more quickly. I must note, though, that the intensity measure here is quite problematic: it simply relates hard time to elapsed time, and does not take into account (for example) takeoffs and landings, when engines undergo the greatest portion of their stress. A useful measure of the intensity of operation would have been engine "cycles," or hours of operation at full throttle; unfortunately, these were very inconsistently recorded in the dataset. Conceivably, an engine with a higher intensity under the measure I use may be one that is used on longer, but fewer, flights, and may thus affect hazard negatively.
The upgrade dummies (see Table 3 ) should proxy technical improvements in the engines and should thus have a negative effect on the hazard rate, since an improved engine is less likely to require service.
I will take no position on airline dummies (All to AI,7), because I do not know the actual airlines involved and thus have no way of discovering their safety records. However, I will venture to assert that as factors leading to the deterioration of an engine are controlled for, a positive coefficient for a given airline is suggestive of a greater willingness to perform maintenance (as opposed to a response to a more problematic collection of engines). The assertion is strengthened by noting that an airline fixed effect applies to all engines operated by the airline, and that it is unlikely that all of an airline's engines in the sample are "lemons."
The DC9 dummy for JT8D engines should have a positive effect on the hazard rate because the DC-9 is a two-engine underwing aircraft. The fact that there are two (versus three for the Boeing 727 ) suggests that the engines are stressed more. Also, mechanics indicated to me that although underwing engines are somewhat easier to service, they seem to have more maintenance problems, possibly because of wing vibration and because nothing is in front of the engines to keep out FOD. The data suffer from neither right nor left censoring because each shop visit cycleexcept for the first installation-is preceded by a shop visit and is followed by another shop visit. Thus, no correction is required. Even though a given engine goes through many cycles (of uptime, shop visit ), following the example of Amemiya ( 1985) and others I treat the uptimes as independent events. In other words, I am assuming that an engine returning to 13lt~hou]d be pointed out that the shopvisitrate as measured here does not include contemPo~neous shop visits, but only those that occurred up to the time of the last shop visit. Thus, this specification should not suffer from any problems of endogeneity. service from the shop is essentially a new engine, having been certified as meeting airworthiness standards. 14 u Estimation results. Parameter estimates derived from a Weibull maximum likelihood approach are efficient if in fact the data-generating process is Weibull. If the process is not Weibull, estimates are not consistent. For this reason, I have also estimated parameters by ordinary least squares ( OLS ), for which at least the claim can be made that estimates provide the best linear predictor. Diagnostics of the specifications tested are discussed later.
Because the Weibull specification allows for duration dependence (if a # 1), the influence of the explanatory variables changes over time. ]5To facilitate interpretation, I computed the value of the derivative of the Weibull hazard function, rf(p, a) = I.Lat a-',with respect to each variable, evaluated at the mean of the variables. In the case of binary explanatory variables, I use L( p (X~, 1, B) , a) -II(~(X~, O, f?), a), where Xj is the mean of the data matrix containing all columns except the binary variable in the jth position; the second argument of~is the assumed value of the binary variable in the jth column. Table 4 gives Weibull and OLS results for JT8D and JT9D engines. Because OLS results provide the best linear predictor (see, for example, Goldberger ( 1991)) of the dependent variable given the covariates, they serve as a basis for comparison for the more restrictive Weibull model. Diagnostics for both specifications are discussed below.
'4This assumption is not completely innocuous, because the FAA has sets of standards for "new," "reconditioned," and "airworthy" engines. However, the data do not allow me to distinguish between servicing that truly regenerate the engine to the "new" status and those that merely render the engine "airworthy." Tbe ramification is that engines repaired to airworthy standards may have somewhat shorter expected service lives than those repaired to reconditioned standards.
'3 If a were to equal one, the model reduces to an exponential distribution of operation times and would indicate a true Markov process (see equation ( 1)). In that case, coefficients can be interpreted direct] y as derivatives of the response variable with respect to the independent variables.
Deregulation is distinguishable as a separate effect negatively influencing the shop visit hazard rate in the Weibull specification and significantly increasing the length of the shop visit cycle in the OLS specification. lb The result stands for both engines at the 10170 significance level whether or not the intensity measure is included. Table 2 shows that while the intensity measure rose significantly since deregulation for JT9D engines, it has not changed significantly for JT8D engines.'7 Because the intensity ratio is a less-than-perfect proxy, I also report Weibull results with the intensity measure not present in Table 4 . The data, however, reject this restriction. 18 Table 4 reveals that intensity has both positive and significant effects on the WeibuIl hazard rates for both engine types. That result seems to indicate that as intensity of use increases (operating hours per month increase ), the likelihood of an engine requiring a shop visit increases. OLS estimates of the intensity coefficient are significant as well. The data seem to support the hypothesis that the more intensively used engines are employed on longer trips and have relatively fewer takeoffs and landings.
Prior shop visit rate has a positive and significant effect on the hazard rate for both engine types. That result most likely comes about because engines with weaker prior histories tend to break down more easily. This explanation is consistent with the OLS results for JT8D but not JT9D engines.
Engine upgrade packages had negative and significant effects on the Weibull hazard in the 7/7A/7B, 15CN, and 17C'N cases for JT8D engines and in the case of 7CN for JT9D engines. That is to say, these particular upgrade packages led to increased service lives for the engines on which they were installed. When intensity is excluded, upgrade packages except Model 15ACN exhibit statistically significant effects relative to Model 1/1A/1 B (the original JT8D model); the statistically significant coefficients all reflect reductions in the hazard rate. All the engine updates applied to the JT9D engines reduce the hazard rate relative to Model 3A, the original JT9D model, when intensity is excluded. OLS results are slightly different: in the JT8D case, 7/7A/ 7B, 15CIV, and 9/9A have significant coefficients, while in the JT9D case, all three upgrades appear to have significant coefficients.
Only airline 4 (AL4) in the JT8D case has significant ( negative ) effects on the Weibull shop visit hazard when intensity is included. Without intensity, airlines 4 and 5 are significant for JT8D engines ( negatively and positively, respectively, with respect to the hazard rate). It follows based on the earlier reasoning that airline 4 is less safety-conscious than its peers, and airline 5 more so. If the intensity measure is excluded, only airline 3 behaves significantly differently-it seems to be less safety-conscious. The OLS results are roughly consistent with the Weibull for JT8D engines; airlines 4 and 5 have significant coefficients with the signs consistent with the Weibull results. The JT9D OLS results show a significant effect for airline 4.
The JT9D engines were installed on only one aircraft type, the Boeing 747, so no aircraft dummy was included. The JT8D engines in the sample were installed on both Boeing 727 and Douglas DC-9 aircraft. The Weibull results indicate that the fact that a given engine is installed on a DC-9 had a positive and significant effect on the hazard rate when intensity is excluded, but no significant effect when intensity is included. The DC-9 efiect is significant in both OLS specifications. This result may reflect more intense usage when the JT8Ds are installed on the DC-9, which is a two-engine aircraft as opposed to the three-engine 727.
IC&.cau~e weib~ll~~timates refer to the influence on the hazard, I report the nesative of estimated ON coefficients in Table 4 to make the coefficients comparable across the two models.
17The f-statistic for the difference in mean "intensity" for JT8D engines is .236, while that for JT9Ds iS6.315. ISThe likelihood ratio for the JTgD engines is 47.8 ( x 2 distribution tail probatillity is 1.5 X 10'9 ), and that for JT9D engines is 163.8 (tail probability also 1.5 X 10-9), As we can observe in Table 2 , the average number of operating hours from a shop visit to the first engine shutdown has increased for both engine types since the regulated era.
Once again, we are confronted with the question of whether this change is caused by the covariates observable in the data or whether deregulation has had an influence. hour would seem to have gone down (because the number of hours from engine removal to first shutdown has increased ), the deregulation coefficient is negative and significant only for the JT8Ds and insignificant for the JT9Ds. These results suggest that the increased length of the shop visit cycle after deregulation has at least not led to a decline in reliability for these engines, when in-flight shutdowns are the proxy for (the inverse of) reliability.
I considered the possibility that because shop visit rate has declined since deregulation, the correlation between the two variables makes the estimates less precise.20 Thus, I reestimated excluding the shop visit rate. Table 5 shows that coefficient estimates are fairly stable (with the exception of the 17CN and 9\9A dummies, which are a very small fraction of the dataset ), but the qualitative results on deregulation remain the same: it led to a significant decline in the likelihood of engine shutdown for JT8D engines and has a statistically insignificant but negative effect for JT9D engines. Although data are not available for other potential reliability indicators, such as average exhaust pressure ratios, exhaust gas temperature readings, and horoscope results, the evidence seems to suggest that engine reliabilityy has either remained constant or improved since deregulation. This result seems even more compelling if we note that, as Table 2 shows, intensity of use (or at least hours of operation per month) have increased in the same period.
Both engine types have strongly significant constants, due to the large random component in engine shutdowns (events beyond the operators' control). Surprisingly, neither engine type shows a significant effect for hours since last shop visit.z 1 However, in the case of JT8Ds, higher shop visit rates significantly decrease the probability of a shutdown. rather than a itself, the standard errors for a are cOmputed using the delta methOd (see Bdlingsley ( 1979) 
e=o"
Performing a grid search for the e that maximizes the log-likelihood of the sample under the assumption of normality did not alter the significance of the D'Agostino-Pearson statistic 24 Thus the OLS results, while lending credence to the results because the technique does provide the best linear predictor, cannot be regarded as efficient estimates. Lancaster ( 1979) noted that the inclusion of more explanatory variables in his model caused the value of a to rise. That observation is consistent with my finding for both engine types, and quite possibly the conclusion that he draws-heterogeneity caused by omitted variables may be responsible for the nonconstant hazard rate-may apply. Lancaster ( 1990 ) provides Jests for unobserved heterogeneity and a nonmonotone hazard. The models do 25 however, there is strong rejection of not seem to suffer from unobserved heterogeneity; the monotone hazard specification.26
One way to address the nonmonotone hazard problem parametrically is to estimate a generalized gamma model, which fits an additional shape parameter. The generalized gamma log-likelihood is
where m is the additional shape parameter (note that if m = 1, the model is identical to the Weibull ). Results from this specification are reported in Table 6 ; the results reject the null hypothesis that m = 1, and the likelihood ratio test rejects a restriction of setting m to unity.
Other results are qualitatively similar to the Weibull and OLS results.
A possible specification error in the logit model is unobserved heterogeneity .27 There appears to be no omnibus specification test for unobserved heterogeneity in the logit framework, so I considered a possible source arising from the engines themselves. The likelihood ratio test did not reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the engine fixed effects are all zero for both JT8D and JT9D engines.28
Conclusion s
The dataset containing complete Pratt & Whitney aircraft engine histories exhibits a clear distinction between maintenance behavior before and after airline deregulation. An likelihood ratio test, The formula for the test statistic in this case is given in the AppendLx. The &ta overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis that the Weibull and OLS models are equivalent in favor of the Weibull being better. The Vuong statistic for the unrestricted (intensity included as a covanate ) JT8D model is 4.958, with associated significance 3.6 X 10'7. The Vuong statistic for the unrestricted JT9D model is 4.459, with associated significance 4.1 X 10-'. For the restricted case, Vuong statistic vahres are 6.403 and 7.211, both with significance 7.7 X 10-7, for JT8D and JT9D models, respectively.
24"Optimal" EOX-COXparameters ranged from .2077 to .3375 for the four specifications in OLS regression equation as well as a form of one of the standard-duration models used to capture the effects of other covariates suggests that deregulation is a significant factor in predicting the length of an engine's shop visit cycle. A logit analysis to predict the probability of an engine shutdown uses the same covanates but suggests that deregulation does not affect that likelihood.
There is support for mechanics' claims that the decline in quantifiable maintenance is a result of deregulation in the airlines. After controlling for improvements signalled by model upgrades in the engines, heterogeneity in airline maintenance practices, unobserved airline heterogeneity, heterogeneity in aircraft types, and the incidence of shutdowns, deregulation seems to have resulted in a lower probability that an engine gets a shop visit. This finding is robust to inclusion of usage intensity as an explanatory variable; however, the intensity variable is a noisy signal that may not adequately proxy the desired effect. Despite the increased time between engine overhauls, there is no evidence of reduced engine reliability as measured by in-flight shutdowns, suggesting that the counterarguments of airline managers may also be correct: safety performance has not suffered since the advent of deregulation. These results verify machinists' union claims that maintenance policies have substantially changed in the deregulated environment, but also back corporate claims that reliability has not suffered.
One way of reconciling these conflicting views is to recognize that quite possibly, new maintenance policies are at variance with the older notions of good maintenance practicethereby leading to the unions' discomfort-but are in fact optimal from the safety standpoint. Some empirical support for this interpretation is found in Kennet ( 1988 ) , where an estimated structural model (based on Rust ( 1987) ) incorporating a dynamic programming model of maintenance decision making into a statistical model suggests that maintenance prior to 1978 was not dynamically optimized but was optimal after 1978.
The results strengthen existing literature on air safety in the deregulated environment, which has unanimously found little cause for concern, but provide the extra reassurance that comes from microdata at the level of the decision makers.
Appendix 9
The X2 statistic in footnote 8 is computed by determining the expected frequency for each of k ranges of values under the null hypothesis that the regulated-era distribution would apply to the deregulated era, fij, and inserting the observed frequencies, O,, from the deregulated era in tbe following formula ( Kenkel, 1989 !-,- Vuong ( 1989 ) shows that this statistic is asymptotically standard normally distributed
